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Indian militants’ camps growing in Bhutan

After remaining silent for almost a decade following Operation Flush Out,’ the massive military assault on Indian Militant’s in Bhutan, the militants camps have started getting the touch of new life once again making it a concern for Indian authority.

According to senior security agency officials, Indian militant groups especially Kamtapur Liberation Organization(KLO) had well established set ups in Bangladesh. They have now started shifting their activity centres to Bhutan adjoining to north East India. These locations in Bhutan are their natural choice due to forest clad off-terrine topography, reported The Economic Times, Wednesday.

“Recent incidents including indiscriminate firing by KLO militants in Assam’s Dhubri , surrender of KLO top leader Chila Roy or independence day boycott call by conglomeration of militants organizations including KLO, NDFB or NLFT is a major indication of the increased activities of these outfits in Bhutan adjoining areas,” said the official.

However, Bhutan Home ministry officials denied any information in this line. “Our Government is too serious against militancy. Bhutan has always cooperated India in all possible manner to fight militancy,” said Consul General of Bhutan Tsering Wangda .

India and Bhutan enjoys 699km common border manned by the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) from the Indian side and by the Royal Bhutan Army on the Bhutan side. Most of the insurgent camps were located along the border, according to the report.

It further said, following upraise of many militants camps, 81st National Assembly of Bhutan adopted a resolution for the last attempt to persuade ULFA, NBFD, and the KLO to close down their camps or to face military action.

Though Bhutan had to launch full fledged military assault on the militant’s camps from 15th of December 2003 to 15th of January 2004 mainly on Indian demand and under multi-directional Indian supports, large section of Bhutan politicians or elites never liked this indirect Indian invasion into their military affairs.

At the same time, despite ‘Operation Flush Out’ Indian intelligence could never confirm complete eradication of Indian Militants activities in Bhutan soil. Naturally, the net outcome of the operation has always remained as a debatable issue that has been refueled by recent activities.